Ethical Autonomous Systems by Arkin, Ronald C.
Full Title:  The Case for Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems 
 
Running Title:  Ethical Autonomous Systems 
 
Author:  Ronald C. Arkin 
 
Contact: Email:  arkin@cc.gatech.edu 
  Telephone:  1-404-894-9311 
 
Institutional Affiliation and Address: 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
85 5th Street NW 




Ronald C. Arkin is Regents' Professor of Computer Science and Director of the Mobile Robot 
Laboratory at Georgia Tech University (Atlanta, GA).  He also serves as the Associate Dean for 
Research and Space Planning in the College of Computing at Georgia Tech since October 2008. 
During 1997-98, Professor Arkin served as STINT visiting Professor at the Centre for 
Autonomous Systems at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, Sweden. From 
June-September 2005, Prof. Arkin held a Sabbatical Chair at the Sony Intelligence Dynamics 
Laboratory in Tokyo, Japan and then served as a member of the Robotics and Artificial 
Intelligence Group at LAAS/CNRS in Toulouse, France from October 2005-August 2006.  His 
research interests include behavior-based reactive control and action-oriented perception for 
mobile robots and unmanned aerial vehicles, hybrid deliberative/reactive software architectures, 
robot survivability, multiagent robotic systems, biorobotics, human-robot interaction, robot 
ethics, and learning in autonomous systems. He has over 170 technical publications in these 
areas. Prof. Arkin has written a textbook entitled Behavior Based Robotics, published hed by MIT 
Press in May 1998, co-edited (with G. Bekey) a book entitled Robot Colonies published in 1997, 
and a book published in Spring 2009 entitled Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots 
published by Chapman-Hall (Taylor & Francis).  The following article is derived principally from 





The underlying thesis of research in ethical autonomy for lethal autonomous unmanned 
systems is that they will potentially be capable of performing more ethically on the battlefield 
than are human soldiers.  In this article this hypothesis is supported by ongoing and foreseen 
technological advances and perhaps equally important by an assessment of the fundamental 
human warfighters in today’s battlespace. If this goal of better-than-human performance is 
achieved, even if still imperfect, it can result in a reduction in noncombatant casualties and 
property damage consistent with adherence to the Laws of War as prescribed in international 
treaties and conventions, and is thus worth pursuing vigorously. 
 





The trend is clear: warfare will continue and autonomous robots will ultimately be 
deployed in its conduct. Referring to the improving technology of the day and its impact 
on the inevitability of warfare, Clausewitz stated ‘the tendency to destroy the adversary 
which lies at the bottom of the conception of War is in no way changed or modified 
through the progress of civilization’ (Clausewitz 1832). More recently, Cook observed 
‘The fact that constraints of just war are routinely overridden is no more a proof of their 
falsity and irrelevance than the existence of immoral behavior ‘refutes’ standards of 
morality: we know the standard, and we also know human beings fall short of that 
standard with depressing regularity’ (Cook 2004). Given this, questions then arise 
regarding if and how these systems can conform as well or better than our soldiers with 
respect to adherence to the existing Laws of War. If achieved, this would result in a 
reduction in collateral damage, i.e., noncombatant casualties and civilian property. The 
body of research conducted in our laboratory (Arkin 2009, Arkin and Ulam 2009, Arkin 
et al 2009) focuses on this issue directly from a design perspective. As robots are already 
faster, stronger, and in certain cases (e.g., chess playing) smarter than humans, is it that 
difficult to believe they will be able to treat us more humanely in the battlefield than we 
do each other? 
This is no simple task, however. In the fog of war it is hard enough for a human to 
be able to effectively discriminate whether or not a target is legitimate. Fortunately for a 
variety of reasons, it may be anticipated, despite the current state of the art, that in the 
future autonomous robots may be able to perform better than humans under these 
conditions, for the following reasons: 
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1. The ability to act conservatively: i.e., they do not need to protect themselves in cases of 
low certainty of target identification. Autonomous armed robotic vehicles do not need to 
have self-preservation as a foremost drive, if at all. They can be used in a self-sacrificing 
manner if needed and appropriate without reservation by a commanding officer. There is 
no need for a ‘shoot first, ask-questions later’ approach. 
 
2. The eventual development and use of a broad range of robotic sensors better equipped 
for battlefield observations than humans currently possess. This includes technological 
advances in electro-optics, synthetic aperture or wall penetrating radars, acoustics, and 
seismic sensing, to name but a few. 
 
3. Unmanned robotic systems can be designed without emotions that cloud their 
judgment or result in anger and frustration with ongoing battlefield events. In addition, 
‘Fear and hysteria are always latent in combat, often real, and they press us toward 
fearful measures and criminal behavior’ (Walzer 1977). Autonomous agents need not 
suffer similarly. 
 
4. Avoidance of the human psychological problem of ‘scenario fulfillment’ is possible, a 
factor believed partly contributing to the downing of an Iranian Airliner by the USS 
Vincennes in 1988 (Sagan 1991). This phenomenon leads to distortion or neglect of 
contradictory information in stressful situations, where humans use new incoming 
information in ways that only fit their pre-existing belief patterns, a form of premature 
cognitive closure. Robots need not be vulnerable to such patterns of behavior. 
 
5. They can integrate more information from more sources far faster before responding 
with lethal force than a human possibly could in real-time. This data can arise from 
multiple remote sensors and intelligence (including human) sources, as part of the 
Army’s network-centric warfare concept (McLouglin 2006) and the concurrent 
development of the Global Information Grid (DARPA 2007). ‘Military systems 
(including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous and 
will create an environment too complex for humans to direct’ (Adams 2002). 
 
6. When working in a team of combined human soldiers and autonomous systems as an 
organic asset, they have the potential capability of independently and objectively 
monitoring ethical behavior in the battlefield by all parties and reporting infractions that 
might be observed. This presence alone might possibly lead to a reduction in human 
ethical infractions. 
 
Aside from these ethical considerations, autonomous robotic systems offer numerous 
other potential operational benefits to the military: faster, cheaper, better mission 
accomplishment; longer range, greater persistence, longer endurance, higher precision; 
faster target engagement; and immunity to chemical and biological weapons among 
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others (Guetlein 2005). All of these can enhance mission effectiveness and serve as 
drivers for the ongoing deployment of these systems. But our research (Arkin 2009) 
focuses on enhancing ethical benefits by using these systems, ideally without eroding 
mission performance when compared to human warfighters. 
 
 
2. Human Failings in the Battlefield 
 
It is not my belief that an autonomous unmanned system will be able to be perfectly 
ethical in the battlefield, but I am convinced that they can perform more ethically than 
human soldiers are capable of performing. Unfortunately the trends in human behavior in 
the battlefield regarding adhering to legal and ethical requirements are questionable at 
best. ‘Armies, armed groups, political and religious movements have been killing 
civilians since time immemorial’ (Slim 2008, p. 3). The dangers of abuse of unmanned 
robotic systems, such as the Predator and Reaper, in war are well documented, which 
occurs even when a human operator is directly in charge (Sullivan 2010, Filkins 2010, 
Adams 2010). Battlefield atrocities1 are as old as warfare. ‘Atrocity… is the most 
repulsive aspect of war, and that which resides within man and permits him to perform 
these acts is the most repulsive aspect of mankind’ (Grossman 1995, p. 229). 
Humanity’s propensity to wage war has gone unabated for as long as history has 
been recorded. One could argue that man’s greatest failing is being on the battlefield in 
the first place. Immanuel Kant asserted ‘War requires no motivation, but appears to be 
ingrained in human nature and is even valued as something noble’ (Kant 1985, p. 125). 
Even Albert Einstein, who remained a pacifist well into his 50s, eventually acknowledged 
‘as long as there will be man, there will be war’ (Isaacson 2007, p. 494). Sigmund Freud 
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was even more to the point: ‘… there is no likelihood of our being able to suppress 
humanity’s aggressive tendencies’ (Isaacson 2007, p. 382). In this article, however, we 
are concerned for the large part with the shortcomings humanity exhibits during the 
conduct of war (jus in bello) as opposed to what brought us there in the first place (jus ad 
bellum).’The emotional strain of warfare and combat cannot be quantified’ (Bourke 1999, 
p. 232), but at least there has recently been a serious attempt to gather data on that 
subject. A recent report from the Surgeon General’s Office (Surgeon General 2006) 
assessing the battlefield ethics and mental health of soldiers and marines deployed in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom is disturbing. The following findings are taken directly from 
that report: 
 
1. Approximately 10% of Soldiers and Marines report mistreating noncombatants 
(damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when not necessary or hit/kicked a noncombatant 
when not necessary). Soldiers that have high levels of anger, experience high levels of 
combat or those who screened positive for a mental health problem were nearly twice as 
likely to mistreat noncombatants as those who had low levels of anger or combat or 
screened negative for a mental health problem. 
 
2. Only 47% of Soldiers and 38% of Marines agreed that noncombatants should be 
treated with dignity and respect. 
 
3. Well over a third of Soldiers and Marines reported torture should be allowed, whether 
to save the life of a fellow Soldier or Marine or to obtain important information about 
insurgents. 
 
4. 17% of Soldiers and Marines agreed or strongly agreed that all noncombatants should 
be treated as insurgents. 
 
5. Just under 10% of Soldiers and Marines reported that their unit modifies the ROE to 
accomplish the mission. 
 
6. 45% of Soldiers and 60% of Marines did not agree that they would report a fellow 
soldier/marine if he had injured or killed an innocent noncombatant. 
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7. Only 43% of Soldiers and 30% of Marines agreed they would report a unit member for 
unnecessarily damaging or destroying private property. 
 
8. Less than half of Soldiers and Marines would report a team member for engaging in 
unethical behavior. 
 
9. A third of Marines and over a quarter of Soldiers did not agree that their NCOs and 
Officers made it clear not to mistreat noncombatants. 
 
10. Although they reported receiving ethical training, 28% of Soldiers and 31% of 
Marines reported facing ethical situations in which they did not know how to 
respond. 
 
11. Soldiers and Marines are more likely to report engaging in the mistreatment of Iraqi 
noncombatants when they are angry, and are twice as likely to engage in unethical 
behavior in the battlefield than when they have low levels of anger. 
 
12. Combat experience, particularly losing a team member, was related to an increase in 
ethical violations. 
 
This formal study, although at the very least disconcerting, is by no means the first report 
of battlefield atrocities. ‘Atrocious behavior was a feature of combat in the two world 
wars, as well as in Vietnam’ (Bourke 1999, p. 163). One sociological study of fighting in 
Vietnam, pointed out that for all men in heavy combat, 1/3 of men in moderate combat, 
and 8% in light combat had seen atrocities or committed or abetted noncombatant murder 
(Strayer and Ellenhorn 1975). These numbers are staggering. 
Possible explanations for the persistence of war crimes by combat troops are 
discussed in (Bill 2000, Parks 1976, Parks 1976a, Danyluk 2000, Slim 2008). These 
include: 
 
• High friendly losses leading to a tendency to seek revenge. 
 
• High turnover in the chain of command, leading to weakened leadership. 
 




• Poorly trained or inexperienced troops. This lack of training is not just in being a good 
soldier, but also in understanding the Laws of War. 
 
• No clearly defined enemy. 
 
• The issuance of unclear orders where the intent of the order may be interpreted 
incorrectly as unlawful. 
 
• Shortage of personnel has been associated in producing stress on combatants that can 
lead to violations. 
 
• Youth and immaturity of troops. 
 
• An overpowering sense of frustration. 
 
• Pleasure from the power of killing. 
 
• External pressure, e.g., for a need to produce a high body count of the enemy. 
 
There is clear room for improvement, and autonomous systems may help. Bourke points 
out that modern warfare enables violent acts in ways unlike before. Now, ‘Combatants 
were able to maintain an emotional distance from their victims largely through the 
application of… technology’ (Bourke 1999, p. xvii). This portends ill for the reduction of 
atrocities by soldiers. We now have bombs being dropped in Afghanistan and Iraq by 
UAV operators from almost halfway around the world in Nevada (Ure 2008). This use of 
technology enables a form of ‘numbed killing’. Bourke further notes that there is now a 
‘technological imperative’ to make full use of the new equipment provided. Although 
technological warfare has reduced the overall number of soldiers required to wage war, 
the price is that technology, while increasing the ability to kill, decreases ‘the awareness 
that dead human beings were the end product’. When killing at a maximum range, one 
can pretend they are not killing human beings, and thus experience no regret (Grossman 
1995). This physical distance detaches the warfighters from the consequences of the use 
of their weaponry. 
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The psychological consequences on our servicemen and women in Afghanistan 
and Iraq have reached record levels. In 2007 alone, 115 soldiers committed suicide, up 
from 102 the previous year; 24% of the suicides were those on their first deployment, and 
43% were those who had returned from deployment. The suicide rates of active duty 
soldiers as of August 2008 ‘were on pace to surpass both last year’s numbers and the rate 
of suicide in the general U.S. population for the first time since the Vietnam war, 
according to U.S. Army officials’ (Mount 2008, p.1). This unfortunately was confirmed 
in July of 2010 (Fifield 10). A statistically significant relationship has been established 
between the suicide attempts and the number of days spent deployed in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. To make matters worse, this is coupled with ‘a growing number of troops 
diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder’ (Sevastopulo 2008, p. 1). 
These psychiatric casualties are quite significant and common (Grossman 1995): 
In World War II alone more than 800,000 men were classified unfit due to psychiatric 
reasons, but an additional 504,000 (approximately fifty divisions) were subsequently 
rendered unfit as a result of psychiatric collapse after induction; In the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
war one-third of the Israel casualties were psychiatric in origin, twice the number of dead 
troops. One WWII study showed that after 60 days of continuous combat, 98% of all 
surviving troops suffer psychiatric trauma of some sort (Swank and Marchand 1946). 
These long-term exposures to combat are a recent trend in battle, emerging in the 20th 
century. The psychiatric damage can result in many forms: battlefield fatigue, conversion 
hysteria, confusional states, anxiety states, obsession and compulsive states, and character 
disorders (Grossman 1995). The overall effect on the ability to wage war is obvious, let 
alone the damage to a nation’s surviving citizens. 
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Creating true warfighters in the first place is a daunting challenge. ‘No matter 
how thorough the training, it still failed to enable most combatants to fight’ (Bourke 
1999, p. 61). In World War II most men simply did not kill. In one U.S. Army interview 
of 400 men, only 15% of the men had actually fired at enemy positions (at least once) 
during an engagement despite the fact that 80% had the opportunity to do so (Marshall 
1947). There was no observed correlation between the experience, terrain, nature of the 
enemy, or accuracy of enemy fire on this percentage. 
This applied to both land and air forces. One study of the Korean War indicated 
that 50% of F-86 pilots never fired their guns and only 10% of those had actually hit a 
target (Sparks and Neiss 1956). During World War II, most fighter pilots never even tried 
to shoot anyone down, let alone succeeding. Less than 1% of the pilots accounted for 30-
40% of all downed enemy aircraft (Grossman 1995, p. 31). 
One conclusion of this is that human soldiers, although not cowardly, lacked an 
‘offensive spirit’. One possible reason for this lack of aggressiveness centers on the use 
of long-distance weapons making battlefields ‘lonely’ and the feeling the enemy was not 
real but a phantom. This dehumanization of the enemy also quells guilt in killing (Bourke 
1999). 
The soldiers in the field are not alone in their complicity. ‘Atrocities are the dark 
secret of military culture’ (Danyluk 2000, p.38). ‘Servicemen of all ranks were 
unperturbed by most of these acts of lawless killing’ (Bourke 1999, p. 173). In Vietnam, 
combat commanders viewed the Laws of War as ‘unnecessary’ and ‘unrealistic’ 
restraining devices which would decrease the opportunity for victory (Parks 1976, p. 21). 
A lawyer, defending one General’s decision not to initiate a court martial for suspected 
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war crimes violations, stated ‘It’s a little like the Ten Commandments – they’re there, but 
no one pays attention to them’ (Hersh 1971, p. 119). 
Nonetheless our military aspires to higher ethical performance. General Douglas 
MacArthur stated: 
 
The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and 
unarmed. It is the very essence and reason for his being. When he violates this 
sacred trust, he not only profanes the cult, but threatens the very fabric of 
international society. (Park, 1976, p.18) 
 
In addition, the impact of atrocities on public opinion, as clearly evidenced by the My Lai 
incident in the Vietnam War, and the consequent effect on troop morale are secondary 
reasons to ensure that events like these are prevented. Civilians are unfortunately killed 
during war by other humans for manifold reasons (Slim 2008): 
 
• Genocidal thinking – ethnic or racial cleansing of populations 
 
• Dualistic thinking – dividing host populations into the ‘good guys’ and the ‘bad guys’ 
 
• Power dominance and subjugation – power lust and to exert force 
 
• Revenge – emotional striking back for perceived wrongs 
 
• Punishment and forced compliance – to shape the behavior of civilian populations 
 
• Utility – it furthers the war strategically 
 
• Asymmetrical necessity – tactical killing of civilians due to an inferior military 
position. 
 
• Profit – mercenary and looting activity 
 
• Eradicating potential – pre-emptive removal of civilians who might otherwise become 
warfighters in the future 
 




• Reluctant killing – through human error or accident, collateral damage. 
 
• Collective and sacrificial thinking – killing of groups rather than individuals, they 
must be sacrificed for a greater good 
 
These forms of thinking are alien to current artificial intelligence efforts and likely are to 
remain so. Armed autonomous systems need not nor should be equipped with any of 
these forms of unacceptable human rationalization or action. 
A primary conclusion is that it seems unrealistic to expect normal human beings 
by their very nature to adhere to the Laws of Warfare when confronted with the horror of 
the battlefield, even when trained. As a Marine Corps Reserves Captain commented: ‘If 
wars cannot be prevented, steps can be taken to ensure that they are at least fought in as 
ethical a manner as possible’ (Danyluk 2000, p. 38). One could argue that battlefield 
atrocities, if left unchecked may become progressively worse, with the progression of 
stand-off weapons and increasing use of technology. Something must be done to restrain 
the technology itself, above and beyond the human limits of the warfighters themselves. 
This is the case for the use of ethical autonomy in unmanned systems. 
 
3. A Way Forward 
 
Research in our laboratory has provided the motivation, philosophy, formalisms, 
representational requirements, architectural design criteria, recommendations, and test 
scenarios to design and construct an autonomous robotic system architecture capable of 
the ethical use of lethal force (Arkin 2009). These first steps toward that goal, however, 
are very preliminary and subject to major revision, but at the very least they can be 
viewed as the beginnings of an ethical robotic warfighter. The primary goal remains to 
enforce international humanitarian law (or the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC)) in the 
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battlefield in a manner that is believed achievable, by creating a class of robots that not 
only comply with the restrictions of international law, but in fact outperform human 
soldiers in their ethical capacity under comparable circumstances.  If successful this will 
result in the saving of noncombatant life and property, ideally without erosion of mission 
performance. It is too early to tell whether this venture will be successful. There are 
daunting problems remaining: 
 
• The transformation of International Protocols and battlefield ethics into machineusable 
representations and real-time reasoning capabilities for bounded morality using modal 
logics. 
 
• Mechanisms to ensure that the design of intelligent behaviors only provide responses 
within rigorously defined ethical boundaries. 
 
• The development of effective perceptual algorithms capable of superior target 
discrimination capabilities, especially with regard to combatant-noncombatant status. 
 
• The creation of techniques to permit the adaptation of an ethical constraint set and 
underlying behavioral control parameters that will ensure moral performance, should 
those norms be violated in any way, involving reflective and affective processing. 
 
• A means to make responsibility assignment clear and explicit for all concerned parties 
regarding the deployment of a machine with a lethal potential on its mission. 
 
 
Hopefully the goals of our limited effort will fuel other scientists’ interest to assist in 
ensuring that the machines that we as roboticists create fit within international and 
societal expectations and requirements. My personal hope would be that they will never 
be needed in the present or the future. But mankind’s tendency toward war seems 
overwhelming and inevitable. At the very least, if we can reduce civilian casualties in 
compliance with applicable protocols of the Geneva Conventions and the ideals 
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enshrined within the Just War tradition, the result will have constituted a significant 




                                                 
1 Atrocity here is defined as the killing of a noncombatant: either a civilian or a former combatant who has 
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